



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

and honest one; does God exist or not? The answer must be as honest as the question: yes or no. Science herself must give the answer, for science herself propounds the question; and, as our readers already understand, we believe her answer will be yes. That is the true state of the case; and we are sorry to see Professor Tyndall helping to confuse the public mind still further by reiterating Herbert Spencer's meaningless jargon on the subject. There is no religion in ignorance; but there is religion in a knowledge that seeks to lessen its own ignorance. There is no religion in mystification, or in the apotheosis of 'insoluble mystery'; but there is religion in the modest recognition of a mystery which we are here to solve, and thereby to convert into known and nutritious truth. That we shall solve it all, least of all in our own day, is not to be expected; but to give up the attempt to solve it on the plea that it is insoluble, is to bury our talent in the earth because we know that we have a hard master.

"For one, we refuse to juggle, or be juggled with, by this empty gibberish of 'the unknowable' or 'the inscrutable.' The 'Power' which confessedly manifests itself in the process of evolution is not only to be studied but known in and through its manifestations or effects; that is, in and through the grand order of Nature, the adaptation of part to part in the organic and limitless whole, the eternal series of sequences according to law by which it has been developed. Admitting that but an 'infinitesimal span' of the wondrous 'cosmical life' is as yet known to us, science has already taught us to seek its explanation in one omnipresent cause. If we consider this one cause to be matter, even in Professor Tyndall's enlarged use of the word, we are defeated in the search for real unity, which is excluded by his illimitable multitude of self-subsistent molecules; we can find it only in such a philosophy of atoms as shall show them to be indeed 'manifestations' of a unitary energy or 'Power.' That is, the way out of Tyndall's imperfect materialism is clear through it into a philosophy which may be called materialistic or spiritualistic as you please, yet which shall recognize the infinite 'cosmical life' as embracing our little human life, not as an alien thing, but as part and parcel of itself. What we require is a more radical treatment of science itself, sure that such a treatment will leave abundant room for every sentiment that now ennobles man, without imposing on him the dire necessity of pouring contempt upon his own 'understanding,' or of narrowing religion down to a mere emotion or feeling, as Professor Tyndall does."

The Immortality of the Historic Individual.

In the last number of this journal Professor Smith continues the discussion of the question of immortality. The difficulty to be decided relates to the idea of Universality.

What can one mean by "historic individual" except the individual *I* or *he* who remembers that he has a distinct past history, in which he has reacted against persons and circumstances, and created his own self and belongings by the act of his WILL, and is now conscious that he is product of his will as producer? His will produces by his own act the universality

which is attributed to man. By the act of negating his particular, special, individual peculiarities he makes himself not an *abstract* universal but a concrete universal, one which is individual as well as universal. For, does it not sustain its phase of universality by the act of its will in negating or abstracting, and is not this act always a special one, a purely individual act? Were this annulment of the special, by means of the activity which is individual, to cease, there would remain neither abstract universal nor individual, but zero. The mistake consists in seizing an abstract *caput mortuum* for the universal instead of a *concrete process*. What I mean by concrete process is a process of self-determination wherein the negative unity which acts is the subject of the act, and freely produces in itself all its multiplicity and dissolves any particular phase of the same at will. It cannot dissolve the total sphere of particularity at once, it is true; for the act of such annulment is itself a particular one, and hence creates what it attempts to destroy. Otherwise the self-relation of the negative act could annul or destroy the subject and thus end its being in a vacuity, like the abstract unity which is the result of the "absorption theory." The ego is always subject-object and hence dual in its unity. Since both sides are the same—the self as subject and the same self as object—we have a concrete unity; and since its knowing is always an acting, we have the existence of the ego an eternal process.

The following communication, received from Mr. Kroeger, continues the same subject. EDITOR.

Mr. Editor:—In the July number of the *Jour. Spec. Philosophy*, Mr. B. C. Smith, referring to an article of mine on the subject of immortality, and, summing up his objections to it, takes occasion to say: "Mr. Kroeger, it seems to me, instead of proving our immortality, has, if anything, proven our immortal immortality." This hits the nail on the head, and seems to me, indeed, too self-evident to need much proof. If any finite being is immortal, i.e. continues to lead a self-conscious life throughout all time, it necessarily remains always more or less immoral, because it remains finite. Were it to lose its finite character, it would become God or be submerged in the Godhead, &c.; all of which suppositions are absurd, for the immortality which inheres in all *res singulares sub specie æternitatis conceptæ* is not in any sense of the word what people mean when they want to know whether they are immortal. Tom does not care a fig whether he will ever be "conscious of being identical with the Absolute," but he is very anxious to know whether he will be forever conscious of being and having been Tom. It seems strange that those who still discuss the subject of immortality always lose sight of this fact.

It does seem somewhat plausible that the moral world would be no more disturbed by my departure from it than it was by my advent into it, as Mr. Smith suggests; but the reason of the difference is precisely because "the moral world is not the world of time," to use Mr. Smith's own words in the same sentence wherein he seems to charge me with presumption in holding that the moral world cannot get along without me. Really, I think it cannot get along without him either.

A. E. KROEGER.